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body of evidence has accumulated which proves that
influence the path of research conducted by public
*
agricultural research institutions.L However, there is also evidence
that the level of investment in agricultural research and the allocation
of that money within the agricultural research system has been less
than optimal. The large number of studies that have calculated the rates
of return to agricultural research indicate that both in developed and
developing countries there has been an underinvestment in agricultural
2
research. Regarding the allocation of resources within the research
system there is evidence to suggest that many national research programs
do not allocate resources between commodities, inputs, and projects very
efficiently at present. Some of the literature on the Green Revolution”
leaves the impression that there was little research in Asia on food
crops before the Green Revolution. Colonial regimes in particular are
criticized for doing research primarily on export andlor plantation
crops which, it is implied, did not maximize the welfare of society as
a whole. “Colonialism stunted indigenous agriculture by directing
3
agricultural research only to export crops”, according to Lappe and
Collins.
This paper attempts to examine these issues with a detailed case
study of the Agriculture Department’s research system in the British
Indian province of the Punjab and then the successor institutions in
Pakistani Punjab. In the case of British India many scholars have been
critical of the low level of expenditure on development activities in
general and the neglect of agricultural science and technology expenditure
in particular. In addition some scholars have suggested that even in-2-
the Punjab with the largest agricultural research program in British
India, there was no measurable impact of technology on agricultural output.
4
The province of Punjab was originally chosen largely because I expected
it to have the best data on agricultural output during the British
period. The long time period from 1905 to 1975 allows me to examine the
long swings in demand for research and the effect of institutional change
which would otherwise be impossible.
The explanations of research resource allocation decisions and
the decisions about the size of the total agricultural research budget
are based on the ideas about the supply and demand of public goods
found in the induced innovation literature, The demand for research
comes from producers who gain increased profits or net income from
certain types of technological change or from consumers who can gain
from lower prices.
“The manner in which the gains from technical change are parti-
tioned between producers and consumers of a particular commodity
depends on the slopes of the demand and supply curves for the
product and on the rates at which these curves are shifting over
time. In a market characterized by a highly elastic demand, or
by rapid growth in demand, producers will be able to retain a
relatively large share of the gains from technical change. In a
market characterized by inelastic demand, or by slow growth of
demand, most of the gains from technical change will be passed
on to consumers in the form of lower product prices.”5
In British Punjab, for example, the British Cotton Industry, the Indian
Cotton Industry, and consumers of cotton goods and wheat hoped to benefit.
They made their desires felt through petitions directly to the British
monarch, through testimony before parliamentary commissions and through
lobbying officials ’in India.
These pressures on the Indian government were translated into the
development of an agricultural research system by setting up institutions,-3-
budgeting money and hiring of scientists. This was the supply side
of our market for public goods. These research institutions supplied
the agricultural research services that were demanded by consumers and
producers of agricultural goods. These institutions had to decide
how to allocate their funds between different factors of production and
between different scientific disciplines. Also, they had to decide
the commodity composition of their output. The efficiency of their
decision making can be judged using the tools of economics. Once
these institutions started to produce useful results there was increased
demand for their services. For example, when the Punjab Agriculture
Department produced longer stapled cotton varieties
wheat around World War I, farmers who grew millets,
also demanded improved varieties.
and higher yielding
oilseeds and pulses
This case study is divided into three sections. The first
describes the achievements of the research system and summarizes the
calculations of the returns to research in the British and Pakistani
period. There is also some information on the distribution of these
gains between different sections of society. The second section attempts
to explain the apparent underinvestment in agricultural research
in terms of changes in the demand for research. The third
to explain the allocation of resources within the research






role of certain groups on the demand side play an important
determining the pattern of resource allocation.-4-
The Impact of Research on Punjabi Agriculture
The story of the Green Revolution in both the Indian and Pakistani
Punjab is well known. However, few people are aware of the contribution
of agricultural science to growth in the Punjab before 1947. The
impression one receives from reading the Indian nationalist literature
is that very little progress was made in agricultural science and that
any economic benefits from the few advances which were made went to
British exporters, consumers and plantation owners rather than Indian
farmers. In fact, agricultural research made an important contribution
to growth both before and after 1947 and the farmers of the Punjab
received substantial benefits from the research.
Specification of the Contribution of Scientists to New Technology
The Punjab Department of Agriculture from its beginning in 1905 -
has been conducting research in a number of disciplinary areas. However,
there is quantitative evidence only on the contribution of plant breeders.
This evidence is in the form of acreage under new varieties and the
effects of these new varieties on yield per acre, cost of production, and/or
quality of the crops. Thus, my estimates of the benefits of agricultural
research will be based on the output of the plant breeders, and my
estimate will be a lower bound estimate because it does not include all
of the output of other disciplines.
The success of the plant breeders in producing new varieties is
shown in Table 1. It contains all of the improved crop varieties for
which evidence of farmer acceptance is available. Evidence must be
i
available showing that farmers actually used it on their fields, not
simply that it was officially approved for cultivation by the Department.-5-
The dates given are the dates the varieties went into connnercialproduc-
tion. In parentheses after each variety is an S, H, Sy, or I, which
indicates whether it was developed by selection, hybridization, as a
synthetic or was introduced from outside South Asia. The other letters
within the parentheses give the location of the research station where
the variety was developed if it was bred in South Asia. If the variety
was an introduction, the country of origin is given.
There are four patterns observable in the output of new varieties
by the DAP. Three of them are evident from Table 1. First, breeders
were successful only in certain crops especially cotton, wheat, and sugar-
cane. Second, even in these crops new varieties were released periodi-
cally rather than as a continuous stream. A third pattern is the impor-
tance of exotic varieties in certain crops after Independence. The fourth
pattern, which is not immediately evident from the table, is that before
1947 only wheat varieties 9-D and C-217 and gram variety C 12/34, were
specifically bred for rainfed rather than irrigated conditions. After
Independence only Barani-70 and Pothwar wheat varieties and gram variety
c-612 were designed for unirrigated conditions. Wheat varieties 8-A
and especially C-591 were also
(C-591 was grown on 31% of the
However, the great majority of
accepted fairly widely on unirrigated land
unirrigated wheat acreage in 1945-46).7
the successful varieties could be used
only in irrigated or high rainfall areas.
The new varieties listed in Table 1 had two primary effects: first,
many of them increased the yield per acre; second, some of them increased
the quality of the crop which led to higher prices when farmers sold
the crop. I have summarized the impact of the most important varieties
in Table 2. The “yield increase” columrs show the percentage increase-6-
in yield over the local
After 1947 the increase
released in the British
unimproved varieties for the British period.
is the percentage improvement over the varieties
period. The data on yield increases both in
experiment station yields and when available on farmers’ fields are
presented. There are problems with both sets of data. The difference
between the old variety and the new variety on experiment stations are
sometimes much higher than in farmers’ fields because they are not grown
under conditions faced by farmers. However, they do have the advantage
that they are usually comparing the different varieties under similar
fertility and agroclimatic conditions. The problem with yields from
the farmers’ fields is that there is no control over the conditions under
which the varieties are grown and so some of the yield differential
may be due to factors other than simply the new variety such as fertilizer,
irrigation and quality, or other inputs. The price premium over the -
old varieties is an average premium for several years from wholesale
markets in the Punjab. I have included only representative varieties
from Table 2.
There are three crops which are not included during the pre-
Independence period in Table 2 in which some progress was also made. In
rice and gram pure line selection and hybridization techniques were
used to produce improved varieties. Rice in the Punjab varied in quality
from the finest in India to some of the coarsest. In each of the four
main rice categories one or two new varieties were selected and released
to the farmers. The quality of these selected varieties seems to have
been better and the yield of the coarse varieties was probably improved.
By 1948 the West Punjab Agriculture Department claimed that 80% rice
acreage was under new varieties. 8 However, there is no quantitative-7-
evidence available about either the quality or yield improvements. In
gram, botanists tried to develop higher yields and disease resistance,
but again there is little quantitative evidence of the impact of the
new varieties. Berseem or Egyptian clover was introduced into India
1912, and at least one official thought it was one of the greatest
achievements of the Agriculture Department. There is data on yields
in
which indicate that this fodder yielded at least 33% more per acre than
the fodders it was replacing.9 Unfortunately, no one reported the
acreage under berseem. It was simply included with the other fodders.
Table 3 gives five year averages of the area under improved varie-
ties and the percentage of the total area of that crop which was under
new varieties. American cotton after its introduction in 1913 quickly
spread to about 40% of the cotton area in the early 1920’s. The early
American varieties could only be sown in the areas which had perennial-
irrigation, and within five years of their introduction, American had
replaced desi (local) cotton
that had proper irrigation.
the 1940’s when the relative
on 90% of the cotton area in the districts
The second period of rapid spread was during
price of American increased due to the
decline in desi prices. Improved desi cottons were not developed until
after 1920. However, they did spread rapidly until the war cut off
several important consumer nations and the price of desi slumped. Improved
wheats made slow but steady progress until the middle 1930’s when C-591
was introduced producing a spurt of rapid growth. This wheat replaced
other improved varieties and local varieties. Improved sugarcane varie-
ties were first introduced in the 1920’s. They replaced local cane at
a steady rate until the 1940’s , when a combination of high prices and
two very good new varieties pushed the acreage under new varieties over 80%.-8-
Regular reports on the acreage under new varieties are not avail-
able for the Punjab during the period when it was part of the Province
of West Pakistan. However, I have gathered all of the available data
in Table 4. The r in each column marks the year when the
were officially released by the government. In the wheat




IRRI varieties. Cotton shows a more gradual acceptance path which is
the result of a stream of new varieties rather than one major breakthrough.




the impression from official reports is that one or two
a major impact as in wheat and rice, and that there has
a leveling off of the diffusion path.
On the basis of the data present in Tables 4 through 6 and informa-
tion on the shape of the supply and demand curves for these crops I have
been able to calculate the economic surplus due to agricultural research.
I have used what is referred to in the literature as the index number
approach.10 For the crops in which there was yield increases I have
estimated the size of the shift in the supply curve on the basis of the
decline in cost due to the use of the new variety. For those crops which
had changes in quality (mainly cotton) I have basically multiplied the
average price premium times the output of the new variety. For all
crops I have made an upper and lower bound estimate of the benefits
because of the problems of finding accurate data.
The costs incurred to produce these benefits include the expenditure
on research and the cost of spreading the information about the value of
these new varieties. However, the budget data from the Department of
Agriculture is not detailed enough to sort out the amount of expenditure-9-
on breeding improved varieties and the expenditure on spreading these
varieties. The budget figures also include expenditure on research by
other disciplines which did not help in the production of new varieties.
More important,the series on extension expenditure includes many things
that had nothing to do with the spread of new varieties. Thus, I have
tried several different expenditure series. I then calculated an inter-
nal rate of return under the different assumptions about benefits and
costs. For the British period the rates of return ranged from 34 to 49
11
percent with the most realistic estimates between 36 and 44 percent.
For the Pakistani period my estimates of the rate of return range from
17 to 45 percent. The greater range is due to greater variation in
the various measures of research and extension expenditure. On the
basis of the most realistic assumptions the internal rate of return in
this period was probably about 30 to 37 percent which is only slightly-
less than the rate of return for the British period.12
These results do support the argument that the British were under-
investing in agricultural research. However, the movement from colonial-
ism to Independence has not greatly improved the efficiency of the
allocation of government resources with respect to aggregate investment
in research. These aggregate figures hide two important shifts which
took place since Independence but which offset each other. One shift
is the declining productivity of the agricultural research program at
least until the mid-1960’s due to the disruption at Independence,
political interference and perhaps diminishing returns. The other shift
is increased research productivity, particularly in wheat, due to the
scientific breakthroughs in breeding high yielding grain varieties in
Mexico and elsewhere outside of Pakistan.-1o-
The rate of return can be compared to the rates of interest at
which funds were available. Bagchi shows that the Government of India
was able to borrow money in London in the pre-World War I and at certain
times during the inter-war periods for less than a 5 percent interest
rate.13 In 1936 it was able to borrow Rs. 120 million at par within
India at 2-3/4 percent.14 After Independence interest rates are clearly
much higher. In the 1960’s the government imposed ceiling on bank
interest rate of 7 or 8 percent clearly was below the scarcity value
of capital. Foreign loans according to Griffin and Rahman had effective
rates of interest of 10 to 15 in the 1960’s.15 Thus, the Pakistani
interest rates were clearly higher than fn the British Punjab, but
internal rates of return to agricultural research of over 30 percent
still made it an attractive investment -- particularly if foreign donors
were anxious to supply these funds.
Finally, it is necessary to examine the distribution of the gains
from research and the cost of the program. In general the gains went to
the producers of the crops in which new varieties were developed. Before
Independence the prices of wheat, sugar, and desi cotton were set by
the international market and the increase in the Punjab’s production
due to new varieties probably did not reduce prices much. Thus few of
the gains in productivity were passed on to the Punjabi consumer. American
cotton may have been the exception because it was used to replace imported
cotton in Indian cotton mills. This probably decreased costs of produc-
ing finer quality cotton materials, and this decrease in costs may well
have been passed on to consumers in the form of cheaper cloth.
After Independence the ban on exporting wheat isolated the Punjab
market from the international market. In this environment technical-11-
change would
have gone to
have reduced wheat prices and much of the
consumers. However, at the same time the
benefits would
government was
processing wheat, which set a floor on wheat prices. This procurement
price ensured that farmers received some of the gains from research.
Also, due to the increased supply the government imported less grain
than it would have, which saved foreign exchange.
cotton research went to the farmers because it was
but the farmer’s gains would have been far greater
implicit or explicit export duties which held down
The benefits from
an export crop,
in the absence of
cotton prices. In




and so much of the benefits were passed along to consumers.
more detailed
and consumers
analysis about all that we can say is that both
shared in the benefits from new varieties and
that the division of benefits was largely determined by government
price and export policies.-12-
The Demand for Agricultural Research
The first section of this paper showed that the rates of return to
investments in agricultural research were very high relative to the normal
rates of return for a development project. These rates of return indicate
that both the British and the Pakistanis could have improved the welfare
of the Punjab by investing more money in agricultural research. The
purpose of this section of the paper is to explain the underinvestment in
research by examining the demand for research. This section will deal
with the problem of the demand for research in three periods. First, there
is the period from about 1900 until the Royal Commission on Agriculture to
India arrived in 1927. The second period is from 1927 until Independence
and the final period is from Independence until 1975.
The first period started with a department of agriculture which w-as
the institutional response to all-India and British pressures. The scientists
of the department during this period consciously developed a program which
they hoped would justify their existence to the government and people of
the Punjab and increase the size of their budget. They were notably suc-
cessful at this. It was an educational period when the Punjab learned
that research could give practical results.
The second period I would characterize as one in which the farmers
and government clearly appreciated the need for research but the depression,
World War II, the Independence movement, and more importantly, the con-
servative financial policy of the British government slowed the growth of
the budget for agriculture. This, in turn, meant little increase in agri-
cultural research spending and underinvestment in agricultural research.-13-
After Independence a far less stringent financial policy was followed,
and so development spending was greatly increased. However, in this period
the possible contribution of agricultural research relative to other types
of investment in agriculture was probably underestimated. This led to a
much smaller percentage of the agriculture department’s budget being
devoted to research while the department’s total budget has increased
greatly.
There had been a Department of Land Records and Agriculture in the
Punjab since 1880. This was the provincial branch of the British Indian
department which was set up as the result of the recommendations of the
Indian Famine Commission of 1880. The main job of this department was
the collection of agricultural statistics, and it did almost no agricultural
research and development work. An agricultural experiment farm was first
set up in Lyallpur in 1901 and some trials of wheat and cotton varieties
were started there. However, research was not carried out on a regular
basis until a separate Department of Agriculture was set up in 1905.
The establishment of the Department of Agriculture of British India
with its Provincial research, extension, and education programs was a
response to at least three sets of pressures. The first was the demand by
both the people of India and the British people and government that
something be done about the catastrophic famines that had killed and
impoverished millions three times in the last quarter of the 19th century.
These famines became increasingly visible as the dimensions of these
tragedies became clearer through the improved statistical services and
the famine commission reports that followed each of the three major
famines. In addition some of the early Indian nationalists were beginning-14-
to write critically about the role of the British rule in causing famine.
The need for research as an important element in improving conditions in
the countryside was stated by the Famine Commission of 1901.1~
In addition to the demand for relief from famine, at least three
smaller pressure groups supported government agricultural research. The
first was the British cotton industry which had long dreamed of ending its
dependence on the United States for medium and long staple cotton. This
dependence had been emphasized at the beginning of the twentieth century
by the short supply andhigh prices of long stapled cotton which the
industry faced. The demand for long stapled cotton was communicated by the
Lancashire cotton industry directly to the King of England, and from him,
through the bureaucracy, to the Indian Department of Land Records and
Agriculture. The second group was the British grain trade which operated
in India and indirectly the British consumers who wanted lower bread prices.
During the first decade of the Twentieth Century about 16 percent of
British wheat and flour imports came from India (and most of that from the
Pumjab). In the Punjab soon after the Department of Agriculture was set
up officials were in close contact with the grain trade. As a former
director of agriculture put it before the Royal Commission: “Large firms
exporting wheat and cotton have generally branches in them (the irrigated
areas) and it is more easy to get into touch with them to find out what is
wanted.”17 What these firms wanted was higher quality wheat and a more
dependable supply. A third group was the jute trade and industry which
wanted improved varieties of jute from Eastern India.
The initial demand for agricultural research was thus a recognition
by the central government and some specific interest groups of the possible
benefits of agricultural research. The Punjab Department of Agriculture, however, .
depended on the Provincial government for three quarts of its financial-15-
support before 1920, and so they had to convince the people with power in
the Punjab that their work could be useful. A review of the strategy of
working on irrigated crops in early period provides evidence of the
Department’s success during this period. This is part of the testimony of
Mr. Milne, the Director of Agriculture, Punjab and the first economic
botanist of the department, before the Royal Commission in 1927. The






In the beginning was there very much belief as to how
good Department of Agriculture could do?
Absolutely none; there was strong belief that it was
of no use whatever.
Barron: ...that was the feeling of the outside public opinion.
First of all I take it that you could prove the value of
your work more quickly on irrigated land than on barani
(.rainfed),could you not?
Milne: Yes.
Barron: ...Do you think if you had devoted a greater part of
your time and energy to work on barani lands, on gram and
so forth, you would have been able to prove the value of
your department quickly enough to get these increased
grants (Rs. 300,000 in 1911-12 to 3,850,000 in 1926-27)
from the Government?
Milne: No, emphatically not.
Barron: So that there has been some method in the principle
adopted by the department, of course with the approval of
Government, to devote most of your time and energy to
nahri (canal irrigated) lands as yielding quicker return?
Milne: Yes; the position is that in the canal irrigated
land we have conditions which are far more constant than
in the barani area, where, for example, in some years
there is no rain while in other years there is a lot of
rain. ‘ The dates of the precipitation are not the same,
&c. You can show something definite on the irrigated land
in a few years, while you cannot do so in the barani
areas; itqvas the proper way to start the work in this
province. ’18-16-
There were major structural changes after World War I which probably
changed the relative importance of the different groups which supported
agricultural research. The first was the devolution of power in 1919
which gave the provinces complete autonomy over agricultural and some
other government activities. This meant that the central government no
longer had any direct influence on the Punjab’s decisions about the
agriculture department and that the budget for that
had to be approved in Delhi. The second change was




increased the influence on the department of large landlords of the
Province. At the same time there was a decrease in influence of the
wheat and cotton trading companies.
By the time of the arrival of the Royal Commission of Agriculture
in India the groups supporting agricultural research in India had
changed considerably. Cotton
Cotton Committee (ICCC) which
that was exported or consumed
representatives of all groups
research was financed by the Indian Central
was funded by a special cess on the cotton
in India. This organization contained
who were interested in Indian cotton,
and, the Indian cotton industry had more influence than the British
industry. The fact that the Indian cotton had never been able to sub-
stitute for cotton from the United States in Great Britain probably
led to a decline in the British industry’s interest. The grain trade
with Britain was unimportant after World War I because the increase in
Indian population increased local demand for grain. The Punjab’s
surplus went to other parts of India rather than Britain. As a result
another pressure group -- the British grain merchants and consumers ---17-
lost interest in Indian research. However, the benefits






demanded more results, At about the same time devolution
increasing democratization of the government provided
more instruments for applying pressure. In testimony
before the Royal Commission they pressed the department to work on
rainfed crops. Farmers who had orchards started coming to the department
for advice in large numbers. The findings of the Royal Commission that
research had been successful in the Punjab and elsewhere
and that research should be increased undoubtedly helped
in British India
convince govern-
ment officials in Britain and in Punjab of the value of agricultural research.
In the Punjab there seems to have been considerable enthusiasm for




most important constraint to growth. Table 5 shows the
research budget from the time that it was listed as a
in the Punjab budget. Research expenditure during the last
part of the British period was growing in both
Perhaps more revealing is the fact that it was
nominal and real terms.
increasing as a percentage
of the Agriculture Department’s budget and as a percentage of the total
budget of the Punjab which was the Punjab governments response to rising
demand. However, the overall constraint to increased spending on develop-
ment remained. The critics of British
1940s have emphasized the conservatism
the low expenditure on the development
fiscal policy during the 1930s and
of the government as the reason for
departments, which included agri-
culture.~g There was a general reluctance of the government to impose new
taxes with which to fund expanded development projects. This was partic-
ularly true during the latter part of the British period when the Congress-18-
Party was organizing farmers against paying land revenue and other groups
to resist taxes in many parts of India. In addition the Provincial
governments had not been given complete freedom to borrow in 1919 and
finance development in that manner. Thomas reports, “borrowed funds
have generally been spent only on railways and irrigation works which
were expected to yield a normal return on the capital invested. ..!1 29
After World War I the criteria for borrowing loosened up somewhat for
railroads and irrigation, but there still was no borrowing for other
types of development projects.
Since Independence there were two trends which are apparent in Table
5. First, there has been a steady increase in the nominal and real
expenditure on research and the expenditure as a percentage of the value
of agricultural output in the Punjab has increased. Second, research
has steadily declined as a percentage of the total agricultural depart-
ment’s budget and of the total Punjab government’s budget. My hypo-
thesis is that the government’s budget constraint was lifted by the
departure of the British and the availability of foreign aid and so
real expenditure on research went up as the total expenditure on
agriculture increased. However, the government’s expected payoff to
investment in agricultural research was low relative to the investments
in extension, chemical plant protection, price supports for grain,
subsidies on inputs like fertilizer, mechanization and irrigation water.
This expectation of relatively low returns to research was due to
three factors -- first, the small output from research during the first
15 years after Independence; second, the high, perhaps exaggerated,
expected economic returns to some of the other investments; and finally,
the immediate payoffs to certain groups when subsidies are given led to-19-
stronger political support for those policies. In the following para-
graphs I will concentrate on
and third factors, which may
research, although the third
of Burki, Alavi, Herring and
the first of these factors. The second
be equally important, both require more
has received some attention in the writings
others. 21
In the first section of this paper it was noted that the cotton crop
was the only one in which there was a stream of new varieties that
continued through the 1950s and early 1960s. In sugarcane two important
selections were made from the old Coimbatore material, but in the other
crops Punjab had to wait until the introduction of new genetic material
from Mexico and the Philippines before research had any impact” The reason
for this decline of productivity is clear -- Independence had disastrous
effects on the agricultural research program. Most of the scientific
personnel except those in the cotton program were Hindus or Sikhs. In 1947
they all left for India. They took with them all of the genetic material
that they could carry
other facilities were
materials in Southern
and the rest was mixed or destroyed. The library and
partially destroyed. The source of sugarcane genetic
India was cut off soon after Independence, and so it
was much more difficult to breed sugarcane.
These difficulties were compounded by the policies of the government
which made recruitment difficult and provided few incentives for practical
research. The primary interest of the first Pakistani governments was in
development through industrialization. Hence, agriculture department jobs
were low status positions, and the pay scales and opportunities for
advancement for officials in the
22
other branches of government.
agriculture departments were less than in
This meant that the agriculture department-20-
could not recruit the best scientists. A second problem was that some of
the people who had to be promoted quickly at Independence had not been
particularly effective researchers. Thus, once they were in power they
emphasized seniority,which strengthened thew rather than scientific outpu~
which might have increased productivity, as the means for advancement.
Third, real research expenditure per scientist declined considerably after
Independence. Finally, politics seems to have played a more important role
appointments and promotion than it had under the British. This impression
may simply be due to the fact that I was able to talk to dissatisfied
in
researchers of the Pakistani period but not of the British period. However,
there does seem to.be evidence that in the first few years after Independence
every decision became politicized.
Whatever the reasons agricultural research did not produce much-other
than cotton varieties until the mid-1960s. In the process they seem to
have lost the support among farmers and officials which they had built up
before 1947. In the previous section I have mentioned that the avail-
ability of high yielding
Pakistani government was
grain, led to a shifting
varieties of wheat and rice at a time when the
particularly aware of their dependence on foreign
of priorities toward grain research in the 1960s.
It was these same pressures and the rapid spread of the Mexican varieties
in the late 1960s which led to the doubling of real expenditure on research
between 1960 and 1972. The high yielding varieties also enabled researchers
to regain the respect of farmers as a source of productivity increasing
varieties. However, it is not clear that the government appreciated the
contribution that local research made. Table 5 shows that the percentage
of the agricultural budget which was spent on research declined in the-21-
first few years of the Bhutto regime (1972). The government seemed to
think that it could continue to import new agricultural technology from
abroad with very little input from local research. In 1975 wheat
breeders discussed with me their on-going battle to convince the govern-
ment that it was not necessary to import more Mexican wheat varieties
and seed because the local research and seed production program could
provide the same quality seed at a lower cost. This is just one indica-
tion of the lack of confidence the government had in its own researchers
and seed multiplication program.
In conclusion, the underinvestment in research was due to two
factors. During the last half of the British period although the demand
for research was strong, the government’s budget constraint tightened
by the depression and the generally conservative fiscal policy prevented
the Punjab from investing more in agricultural research. During the
Pakistani period the fiscal policy became more liberal and the budget
constraint was released in part by foreign aid. The demand for research
was weak before the Green Revolution varieties arrived because of the
absence of concrete payoffs. After the Green Revolution farmer support
for research seems to have grown rapidly but government interest in
local research has been deflected by the apparent availability of tech-
nology from foreign institutions and greater short run political payoff
to other agricultural programs.-22-
Efficiency of Resource Allocation Within
the Agricultural Research Program
There is a series of decisions which scientists, administrators, and
politicians have to make about allocating resources within the agricul-
tural research system. The one which has prompted the most discussion
is the decision about the commodity priorities of the research system.
The preceding section has confirmed the observation by economic histor-
ians that the benefits from research were concentrated in a few crops
during the British period. However, these crops included the main food
crop of the Punjab - wheat. In addition the Punjab government after
Independence continued to have most of its success in the same commodi-
ties. Therefore, there
affected the allocation
In addition to the
is no clear evidence that colonialism adversely
of resources between the different crops.
allocation of resources between commodities,
policy-maker’s decisions include the choice of whether to work on the
problems of irrigated or unirrigated agriculture; the choice of working
to develop land-saving or labor-saving techniques; choices about working
on quality or yield improvement; the mix of scientific manpower, physical
capital, information flows and other inputs; and within disciplines the
decisions about which scientific techniques to use. The case for
irrigated versus unirrigated crops was presented by Milne on page
This section of the paper will test the efficiency of the allocation of




Although none of these decisions can be tested very
is possible to have some idea about the efficiency of
of resources and to find some of the sources of inefficiency.-23-
Boyce and Evenson23 have
ciency in allocating research
they have termed congruence.
suggested a rough rule of economic effi-
resources to different commodities which




a commodity should be the same as its percentage of the value
agricultural production. Empirically, they have shown that as
systems mature they move in this direction and that the older,
more developed, research systems follow this rule more closely than
less developed systems. However, it makes three important assumptions
which may not hold for decision-makers at a specific point in time.
The first is that the resources required to improve any commodity are
roughly equal. The second is that the price elasticities of demand and
growth of future demand for the commodities are roughly equal. The third
is that innovations will spread equally fast in all commodities. If
the assumptions do not hold, then it is possible that decisions which
do not follow this rule are still economically efficient. Another
possibility is that economically inefficient decisions* were politically
efficient in that they were responding the demands of certain politically
powerful special interest groups. Finally, it is possible that researchers
made poor decisions because there was no incentive to try to be efficient.
Therefore, I will first use this rule to highlight possible economic
inefficiencies, and then I will examine some of the apparent inefficien-
cies to find out whether were inefficient or not. If they are, I will
try to find out why they took place.
* However, these decisions may have been efficient in maximizing political
support for the research institutions which in turn led to larger
aggregate investments in research and thus aggregate expenditures
closer to an efficient level.-24-
The number of scientific-man-years found in Table 6 is the best
quantitative data that is available on the distribution of resources
between commodities. It does have problems because some of the crops like
cotton may have gotten more resources in the form of farms and equipment
than is indicated by the number of scientists. However, in general this
distortion is not great, and the few cases where it is a problem will
be discussed below.
In the early days of the Department the research work was concentrated
on wheat and cotton. The first Economic Botanist, Mr. Milne was asked
about this by the Royal Commission , which in 1926 was explicitly think-
ing about the congruence rule.
Commission: Do you think that the work done on crops in the Punjab
bears due proportion to the value of the crops of the Punjab?
Wheat, for instance, is about 43 percent, and cotton is 10 percent.
Would you say you put four times as much work into wheat as into
cotton?
Milne: I do not think we went into spending time in proportion to
the value of the crop. Wheats and cottons are two valuable crops,
and we do what we can for both of them with the staff that we
have available.24
Table 7 shows the distribution of scientists and the value of crops
in later periods. The year 1960 is the only one in which I have a break-
down of the budget by crop. It suggests that SMY’S are not a good
measure only in the oilseed and cotton cases. There are a few generali-
zations that can be made with some confidence. First, wheat did not
receive its share of resources after the mid-1920’s. However, this
situation improved somewhat after 1971 with the establishment of the
rainfed wheat institute. Second, the large share of resources in
cotton, mentioned above by the Royal Counnission,continued until 1971
when its share of resources fell below its share of value. Third, the
oilseeds seem to have received more than their share of resources even-25-
if we do not use the percentage of expenditure rather than SYM’S. Fourth,
the millets were roughly in line with congruence except in the first
period when the combined share of resources of millets and maize was
higher than the share of value. Fifth, maize apparently received too
many resources throughout this period. Sixth, sugarcane was roughly
congruent. Finally, there seems to have been an overemphasis on cash
crops as a group until 1971 and the shift from a colonial to an inde-
pendent government in 1947 had little effect on this situation.
This initial decision to concentrate on wheat and cotton was not
made by the researchers. When Milne took up his post, he was told
explicitly by his superiorsin the government that “cottons and wheats
are the main crops in the Punjab and that it was my duty, whatever my
tastes were to improve these crops in preference to others.”25 In
fact the decision seems to have been made at the all-India level. The
special crop programs considered at the first and second meetings of
the Indian Board of Agriculture in 1905 and 1906 were cotton, jute, wheat
and tobacco. These meetings led to the appointment of a wheat specialist
and a cotton specialist before any other all-India crop specialist.
The wheat specialist was particularly active in the Punjab before Mr.
Milne was appointed. He made the first systematic collection of wheat
varieties in the Punjab and selected the first improved variety.
The enthusiasm of the British for cotton and wheat clearly was not
simply the product of the governments’ desire to serve the needs of the
Indian people. An official report of the second meeting of the Board
of Agriculture stated: “The improvement of Indian wheat was considered
largely from the point of view of the export trade. This has recently
reached very large proportions, India having supplied more wheat to the
,-26- .,
U.K. in 1904-5 than any other country. 26 me link between British needs
and interest in cotton research was equally direct. The first Board of
Agriculture meeting considered a memorial from the British Cotton
Growing Association dated 30th December 1904. The memorial refers to
“the serious importance of the shortage which has occurred in recent
years in the supply of raw cotton (in Great Britain) ... during the last
two years.” This shortage was caused by the decline in American produc-
tion due to the boll weevil attack at this time. The memorial went on
to say: “we do not necessarily advocate that further larger attempts
should be made to introduce exotic varieties. Much good will be done
if careful selection is carried on with native varieties only.
same time, we would strongly recommend that further experiments




quite possible that in some parts of India foreign
!!27The fact that more successful than native ones.




that the Provincial government was fully aware of the British Cotton
Growers Association’s position.
To neglect the crops which made up the other 47 percent of the value
of crops in 1926 would seem to be inefficient. However, the neglect of
the other crops before 1928 is somewhat exaggerated by Table 6. Research
on sugarcane was conducted by the agricultural chemist, and so it does
not show up in the table. All sugarcane breeding had to be conducted in
South India, because it does not flower in the Punjab. The subordinate
staff of the Punjab Agriculture Department conducted trials of the
varieties which were bred in South India, and this program was very
successful. In most other crops some exploratory work was done -- asmall collection of
to see if there was
-27-
local varieties was collected, and these were grown
any striking variability in the crop. However, no
important breeding work was started until the late 1920’s.
After the initial successes in wheat and cotton the Department’s
decision about moving into work on other crops seems to have been left
to the researchers within the department. In the early 1920’s there
still were only a handful of scientists, and so they were forced to
choose fairly carefully which crops to work on. The basis of their
decision not to spend much time on the pulses, oilseeds, and millets as
indicated by their testimony before the Royal Commission and in written
papers seems to have been a combination of the low probability of produc-
ing important economic gains and the cost of producing those gains.
Gram was the
in acreage it was
Milne if any work
Very little.
third most valuable crop in the Punjab in 192528 and
second only to wheat. When the Commission asked
had been done on gram, he replied:
I made a collection of all the types of gram I
could find in the Province, and I have sown these pure types
along side one another with a view of seeing which is the best
from a farmer’s point of view in an acreage season. But gram
is a very tricky crop to grow because the results are so variable;
it is not nearly as steady a crop as wheat is. YOU will find
the outturns fluctuating up and down annually, with the result
that it is not easy to get down to anything definite with gram. 29
Later tests in Lyallpur confirmed that on the same soil under similar
weather conditions the variance of gram yields was much greater than the
variance of wheat yields. This made it harder for breeders who were
not using statistical techniques to pick out the improved varieties.
The millets, maize, and oilseeds made up 4 percent of the value of
the main field crops in 1929. However, they received little attention
before 1926. This neglect was attributed to the cost of improving these-28-
crops, all of which were highly cross-pollinated. Developing a pure line
(or inbred line) or cross-pollinated crop required that each plant be
self-pollinated by hand each segregating generation in contrast to
wheat or cotton which are largely self-fertilized and thus require no
such artificial self-pollination. The comments of Sir Albert Howard,
the Economic Botanist for British India, on the oilseeds also hold for
bajra and maize. In his 1924 book on Indian agriculture, he said:
In the case of sarson, rai, and toria -- the rape and mustard
seed of commerce -- gingelly, safflower, and castor, the amount
of natural cross-fertilization is so great that the labor involved
in isolating high-yielding unit species and in maintaining them
in pure culture is greater than the means of the present Agri-
cultural Department allow .... Form-separation, within rather
wide limits, which would allow of crossing between the types, is
perhaps the utmost the plant breeder can accomplish. 3°
This assessment of the expense
pessimism about mass-selection
widespread among scientists in
They also recognized that once
pure-line had would be lost in
of pure-line breeding along with his
(which he calls form-separation) was .
the Provinces at least until the 1930’s.
in the farmers’ fields, any advantage the
a year or two because of cross-pollination
with the local varieties unless farmers bought new seed from the Depart-
ment each year.
The expansion of the departmental research that took place in the
late 1920’s into gram, cross-pollinated crops, and fruits was largely
due to forces outside the scientists’ control. The position of these
crops changed from neglect to one of too much attention. Table 7 indi-
cates that in 1929 millets, gram (legumes), and oilseeds, which made up
about 28 percent of the value of the main field crops, were receiving
42 percent of the scientific manpower. Fruits (not included in Table 7
for lack of output data) which were at most 5 percent of the total value
of crops were being worked on by two horticulturalists while wheat and-29-
barley which were 44 percent of the value of crops had only one senior
scientist.
The cause of this movement away from congruence was a shift in
demand for breeders’ output. The success of cotton variety 4-F and
wheat varieties 8-A and P-n made farmers and officials in the government
aware of the potential benefits from the research program. By 1927
when the Royal Commission on Agriculture visited the Punjab, several
Punjab officials who were not in the agriculture department criticized
the fact that the researchers were working only on wheat and cotton. 31
The Commission asked researchers about this bias, and in their report
they recommended that the provincial agricultural departments spend
more of their time on crops like gram, bajra, and jowar. 32 This demand
pressure undoubtedly shaped the way in which the new funds were spent.
There was also strong demand for information on fruit:
In July, 1926, Government appointed a Fruit Specialist temporarily,
but as soon as it was known that a Fruit Specialist had been
appointed there was an overwhelming demand from farmers in all
parts of the Province for help and advice, and Government has
given administrative approval for the inclusion of a ost of a
@
second Fruit Specialist in the next years’ budget.
The demand for research on this crop was narrowly based (there were only
39,000 acres of orchard in the Punjab in 1926P4 but because most of
the orchard owners were well-off landowners and many of them were European
they had much more influence than the value of their crop as their
numbers suggest.
By 1929 the pressure to produce new wheat varieties decreased
somewhat because it was no longer exported out of India, and so the
British government and private British trading companies were no longer
interested. Some of the slack was taken up by big wheat farmers who
were active in Provincial politics and were by now aware that the Depart--30-
ment of Agriculture had something to
to balance demands for work on other
research resources dropped sharply.
offer. However, it was insufficient
crops and so wheats share of
Cotton continued to be the most
researched crop because of the organization of the Indian Central Cotton
Committee. In 1917-18 the Indian Cotton Committee had investigated
the prospects for increasing the cultivation of cotton, especially
American cotton in India. As a result of their recommendations the
Indian Central Cotton Committee was founded in 1921, This committee
was supposed to represent all sections of the cotton industry. It was
headed by a government official and had representatives of the provincial
agricultural departments, the Indian states, the cotton growers, cotton
ginners, spinners, and merchants. It was funded through a small tax
or cess on all cotton ginned or exported. One of its main activities
was to fund cotton research and from 1925 onwards, this committee and
its successor, the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, provided most of
the funds for the agriculture departments research work on cotton.
There were few major changes in the distribution of scientific
manpower during the rest of the British period. One scientist was
added to the oilseeds program in the 1940’s, a vegetable specialist was
added, and the millets were shifted into the cereals section. Within
the different crop research programs there was some shifting of priori-
ties which showed that researchers
of farmers. When World War II cut
staple cotton, the cotton research
were responsive to the changing needs
off the Japanese demand for short
people shifted all of their efforts
into the longer-staple American cotton. They developed the main cotton
varieties which were released in both the Indian and the Pakistani Punjab
between 1947 and 1960. The research work on gram varieties concentrated-31-
on producing varieties that were resistant to the blight and wilt
diseases that attacked gram in the late 1930’s and 1940’s.
A simplistic view of the shift from colonialism to Independence
would suggest that the replacement of Britain by Pakistan as the sovereign
power should have eliminated the demand pressure applied by British
manufacturers, British consumers, and British farmers and merchants
residing in India. This would allow the people of Pakistan more
influence and their demand would shift the research emphasis away from
export crops to the basic food crops. However, no substantial shift
took place. The output from the research system continued to be con-
centrated in wheat and cotton. New technology in sugarcane was some-
what less important after Independence and benefits in rice and maize
eventually were quite significant. Tables 6 and 7 show that the actual
allocation of researchers between different commodities had changed
very little by 1950, three years after Independence.
There are several reasons why the expected changes did not take
place at Independence. First, the importance of the British consumer
and the British manufacturers in the making of policy in British India
had been declining long before Independence. At the Provincial level
this influence on agricultural policy had been declining since World
War I. Provincial autonomy and the development of democratic institutions
plus low payoffs for British cotton and wheat interests combined to
decrease British interest and influence. Second, the influence of
Manchester cotton interests on the British government had been declining
35 Third, the institutional financing since the turn of the century.
of research on the main export crop, cotton, was basically set by the
size of the cotton crop and the decision of the government about the
size of cess on the cotton trade. This meant that in contrast to other-32-
crops there was a steady supply of money to finance cotton research
which was not as vulnerable to changing governments. Fourth, the govern-
ment after Independence continued to be interested in export crops.
They were seen as a source of foreign exchange with which industrial
development could be financed.
By 1960 all crops were receiving more attention by breeders, but
there seems to have been little change in the allocation of resources
to different crops. The.main
breeders working on oilseeds.
six most important oilseeds.
change was the increase in the number of
There was one botanist for each of the
This greatly exaggerates the actual
expenditure on oilseeds. If actual expenditure is used the share of
resources going to cotton and oilseeds is reversed -- cotton received
almost 40 percent while oilseeds got 10 Fercent. The shift from
being
1952,
an exporter of wheat to being an importer, which took place in
does not seem to have generated much pressure for more wheat
research. Beringer and Irshad, writing in the early 1960’s,have
suggested that the availability of PL-480 wheat generally decreased
the pressure on government to invest in agriculture:
...“there is a danger that the relatively stable urban food-price
situation which has been maintained with the help of PL-480
imports is beginning to blur the government’s vision of the .-
seriousness of the agricultural
An examination of the price of wheat
from 1947 to 1975 shows no important
indicates that government import and
supply situation in Pakistan. !Iyfi
relative to the price of cotton
shift upward of wheat prices. This
price policies kept the food situa-
tion from putting pressure on food prices.
The one grain which did receive increasing attention was maize.
The inspiration apparently was the recent success of hybrids in the-33-
IJ. so With technical assistance from the U.S. a hybrid corn research
program was started. Hybrids were released but little acreage was
covered because a hybrid seed industry did not develop.
In the 1960’s the shift toward more work on food grains and thus
increased efficiency finally took place. Table 8 shows that in 1960
food grains and pulses had about 35 percent of
1971 this increased to about 53 percent. This
big increase in scientists working on rice and
the scientists. In
change was due to a
maize. These changes
were caused by important changes in both the supply and demand for tech-
nology in these commodities. Because of the poor record of grain




demand for new technology in food grains. However, the cut-
United States food grain aid during and after the Indo-Pakistan
1965 and two years of drought made President Ayub Khan realize
his vulnerability to changes in U.S. policy and fluctuations in the
weather. This led to a shifting of priorities and a determination to
become self-sufficient in food grains as soon as possible.3’7 At the
same time the President became aware of the availability of Mexican
wheat and its potential for increasing yields in Pakistan. This aware-
ness was due to a considerable amount of groundwork by Pakistan scien-
tists aided by CIMMYT
took off very quickly
of the government for
and the Ford Foundation. When wheat production
in the last few years of the 1960’s, the enthusiasm
other crops like rice and maize in which high
yielding varieties had been developed in the international centers
agricultural research was very high. Therefore, large programs in
these crops were started.
for-34-
Demand for research by
decision makers again after
farmers became an important influence on
the spectacular success of Mexican wheat
and IRRI rice. Three changes have taken place in the research system
which reflect this demand pressure (although they do not show up in
Table 7). Bajra and jowar have been getting an increasing amount of
attention from the maize research people since the late 1960’s. A
separate section for work on gram was set up in 1971. It is developing
a collection of varieties and beginning to do some breeding. Also a
separate program for the development of rainfed wheat has been set up.
These programs are clearly in response to the demands of farmers in
the rainfed areas of the province who have benefitted little from
Green Revolution crop varieties. Whether they are economically efficient
remains to be seen.
In general most of the diversions from the congruency rule seem
to have been movements away from economic efficiency. This was the
case with the relatively large amount of resources spent on millets,
maize, oilseeds, and fruit in 1929, probably maize research in the
1960’s. The continuing flow of
partially justified on economic
good and an important source of
resources to cotton research can be only
grounds as the Punjab’s main export
foreign exchange. The differences in
the elasticities of demand for cotton and other crops were not
sufficiently large to outweigh the difference in the value of the crop.
The expost analysis in my thesis confirms this.38’ In contrast, the
neglect of pulses, oilseeds, millets, and maize in the first 20 years
of the Department’s existence appears to have been an efficient decision
given the lack of staff and breeding technology of that period.-35-
The major shifts in the allocation of resources were largely due
to the realization of farmers or individuals within the government that
research could play an important role in agricultural development. In
the 1920’s new cotton and wheat varieties had proven themselves in
irrigated areas and so farmers and officials in other areas wanted
research done on their crops and problems. In a similar manner the
Green Revolution varieties of wheat and to a lesser extent rice proved
the value of research in the 1960’s leading to enthusiasm for research
on other crops. Throughout the period cotton was supported by industry
through a central cotton committee.
The second set of choices to be examined is the choice of discipline
which also at least partially determines whether research is applied or
basic. After the initial selection of three disciplines -- agricultural
chemistry, economic botany and agronomy -- the staffing decisions of
the Department of Agriculture had three main characteristics. First,
the disciplines were chosen on the basis of how much they could contribute
to the solution of practical problems. This leads to the second charac-
teristic which is that the disciplines which contributed the most grew
most rapidly and to the third characteristic that new disciplines were
added when a specific need arose.
The growth of the research staff in different disciplines is shown
in Table 9. An agricultural chemist, economic botanist and agronomist
were appointed to each provincial department of agriculture in British
India around 1907. In the Punjab an agricultural engineer was also
appointed, but he did not do any research except for a period of about
10 years starting in the 1920’s. In 1905 it was clear that the British
expected the best results would come from the agricultural chemist. In
the Punjab the chemist immediately started work on salinity and water--36-
logging problems of the canal irrigated areas of the Province. However,
he did not come up with any practical techniques for solving this problem
before this topic was taken over by the Irrigation Department in 1925.
At that time this discipline shifted into research on animal nutrition
in which they did some basic research and some work with fertilizers
although most of the fertilizer experiments were conducted by the
agronomist.
The agronomist carried out a number of experiments on cultural
practices such as fertilizer application, planting crops in rows, re-
placing local plows with iron plows, green manures, different rotations
and introducing new fodders. Most of these were not widely used in
the early days. Some of his findings were negative. He showed that




the teens and 1920’s. Later he tried steam plows and
agricultural engineer and found that they were not
Punjab before World War 11.39 Thus, the impact of the
agronomist does not seem to have been great and what impact he had
was not easily measurable.
In contrast to the other scientist the results of the Economic
Botanist’s research were quick, economically important and very visible.
Five years after his appointment in 1907 he had released new wheat and
cotton varieties. By 1920 the wheat varieties were being grown on
600,000 acres and the cotton varieties on almost 500,000 acres (Table
3). As shown in the first section of this paper there continued to be
a stream of new varieties from the botanists both before the after Inde-
pendence. The results of this success for the disciplinary mix is
obvious from Table 8. The research staff became predominantly botanists
by 1928 and has remained that way to the present.-37-
Many of the additions to the other disciplines can be explained
as the reaction to specific problems which faced the farmers. For
example, the outbreak of “tirak” disease in cotton which caused premature
opening of the bolls at first led to some part-time work by department
scientists. Then it was decided to appoint a full-time plant physiologist
to work on this problem. He does not show up on Table 8 because he
was hired only for five years in the 1930’s. Similarly the serious
blight and wilt disease attacks in the gram crop led the department
to hire a second mycologist in the late 1930’s. The increase in
agronomists in the 1960’s is a function of the payoffs to better
management of the HYVS of wheat and rice.
The above decisions about disciplines appear to be justified
economic grounds. There were other decisions that do not look as
on
efficient. The increase in entomologists in the 1940’s may represent
only a small increase in research since many of them were involved in
monitoring pest attack rather than actually conducting research. Thus,
this imbalance may have been more apparent than real. The decline in
entomological research in the 1960’s is harder to understand considering
the pest management problems in cotton, sugarcane and the new rice
varieties, which had probably been made worse by the widespread, spraying
of insecticide in the 1960’s. Another possible distortion (although
many scientists might argue this was a source of efficiency) was the
absence of agricultural economists in the agricultural research institutions.
The department’s allocation of resources to research which would
increase the efficiency of input use appears to have
Although there was no explicit policy on land-saving




scarcity of land. The resources which the department put into develop-
ing mechanical technology have been small. Most of the time there was
no agricultural engineer and the agronomist devoted little time to it.
The biological sciences which aimed at increasing the quantity or value
of output per acre received most of the research resources (the numbers
of biological scientists dominate Table 8). This continued to the present
despite the increase in mechanized farming in the Punjab in recent years.
In addition the research of the agricultural chemist in the early days was
largely to improve yields or bring back into cultivation irrigated land




use of chemical fertilizer and the breeding of fertilizer
was responsive to changes in the availability and price.
of fertilizer. The early trials by the agronomist indicated that chemical
fertilizers were not economical, and so they were not recommended nor was -
fertilizer responsiveness a major goal of the breeding programs. Instead
they attempted to improve the quality and the yield per acre under low
fertility conditions. In the 1920’s the ratio of price of nitrogen to
40
price of wheat ranged from 7.3 to 15.6. However, with the introduction
of imported fertilizer in the 1950’s and then the local production of
fertilizer, prices were greatly reduced. In 1960 the ratio of fertilizer
to wheat price was 2.3 and in 1970 it was 1.73.~’ Fertilizer responsiveness
became one of their goals and fertilizer trials became an important part of
the agronomy research program. The dwarf wheat and rice varieties from
the international centers enabled the breeders to fulfill their goals. In
sum, the Punjab research program has shown itself to be responsive to the
relative scarcity of the various inputs of the agricultural production process.-39-
To conclude this section on the allocation of resources within the
agricultural research program, on the supply side the pressure for
economic efficiency within the institutions runs through the decisions that
we examined. However, this pressure for economic efficiency was at times
successfully countered by demand side pressures. The commodity allocation
was pulled away from efficiency by influential small groups such as the
fruit growers, by well organized institutions such as the Central Cotton
Committees, and by farmers in certain agro-climatic zones like the rainfed
areas. Regarding the decision about the disciplines, the research institute
played the main role and so these decisions were made on a fairly rational
basis. Scientists could have put too much emphasis on academic rather than
practical disciplines if there were no pressure from the political structure
for practical results. In the Punjab there was pressure for practical
results and the decisions about disciplines seems to have been quite efficient.
Finally, the direction of research with regard to the inputs which should





and the political system during most of the period considered
was the scarce input. Even toward the end of the period when
more important, the political system did not turn to the
for new mechanical technology.-40-
Conclusion
The first section of this paper provides quantitative information
on the impact of new technology on the economy of the Punjab. The rates
of return on research expenditure were above 30 percent in both the
British and Pakistani periods. The main improvements were in the wheat,
cotton, and sugarcane crops with some improvements in rice, gram and
fodders. After Independence the benefits of technology continued to
be concentrated in wheat, cotton and sugarcane. Rice registered large
improvements and there was measurable improvement in maize. The main
beneficiaries of the research program were the farmers of the Punjab
during both periods. Indian and Pakistani consumers of cloth and cotton
industries gained some of the benefits of improved cotton varieties,
Indian and Pakistani consumers may also have received benefits through.
somewhat lower grain prices. The groups which did not benefit were
British industrialists or consumers. These findings indicate that
contrary to the assumption of some authors, research did make substantial
contributions to the growth of the Punjab’s income and much of that con-
tribution was in food grain before the Green Revolution.
To summarize the issues of underinvestment in agricultural research
and the efficiency of the allocation of resources within the research
system I have used the induced innovation framework which is presented
diagrammatically in Figure 1. The categories listed in the first column
of Table 9 correspond to the circles in Figure 1. They represent the
perceptions or actions of the people in the institutions represented by
the boxes in Figure 1. With this table I can trace the historical develop-
ment of the agricultural research system by following Figure 1 in a
clockwise direction. For example, in column 2 of Table 9 the British-41-
cotton industry in 1900 thought that it could lower the costs of its
inputs if the Indian agricultural departments developed long staple
cotton. The perceived supply of innovations was long staple cotton
varieties and the expected payoff was increased profit for the British .
cotton industry. They put political pressure on
latent demand for innovation) and the government
economic botanists and instructing them to spend
the government (the
responded by appointing
a major part of their
time on cotton (actual demand). This led to new, longer-stapled cotton
varieties (actual supply). However, the benefits went to the Indian
cotton industry and the Punjabi farmers instead of the British industry
and consumers as had been expected. There is no need to go through the
entire table here. However, I will use it to illustrate my conclusions
about the major issues posed at the beginning of the paper.
The rates of return in excess of 30 percent indicate that there was
a continuing underinvestment in agricultural research in the Punjab.
The suggested reason for this underinvestment in the first period -- that
colonial governments underinvest because they are colonialists and only
interested in exploiting the colony -- is too simple. The continued
underinvestment in agricultural research by the Independent governments of
Pakistan, India and other Asian countries indicates that Independence
was not sufficient to improve the situation. The actual reasons for
this underinvestment seem to have been different for different periods.
Before the 1920’s the public pressure or demand for expenditure on
agricultural research simply was not there. Only the British grain trade
and cotton industry saw any payoff to agricultural research. Farmers in
general could not read and so did not appreciate the possibilities of
applying science to agriculture. They had not seen any practical benefits-42-
of research. After the success of the first cotton and wheat varieties
(round 2 in Table 9) farmers wanted to continue to receive improved crop
varieties and Bombay wanted improved cotton, and so they put pressure
on the legislative councils for more research expenditure or in the
case of cotton for institutional innovation which would ensure funding
for research expenditure. The provincial legislative council responded
by increasing its expenditure on research. However, the conservative
fiscal policies of the colonial government and the inability to raise
revenue constrained the growth of research. This probably was the most
obvious negative effect of British control.
The underinvestment in the Pakistani period also went through two
periods. In the first (round 3) farmers still had expectations that
agricultural research could produce new varieties. However, the dis-
ruption of the research institutions at Independence and the lack of
interest in agriculture by the early Pakistani governments meant no big
increases in expenditure and that very few new varieties of crops other
than cotton were produced. Thus, the actual payoff matrix includes
entries only for the cotton farmers and the expected payoff matrix in
the next round probably only included cotton farmers and manufacturers.
Therefore, in the 4th round there was little popular demand for agricul-
tural research. However, the government decided in the late 1960’s to
boost the actual demand for research as indicatedby the increase in
research expenditure. This government decision was due to the realiza-
tion that the country’s food supply was very vulnerable to U.S. policies
on food aid and second, the realization that Mexican wheat varieties
could make food grain self-sufficiency possible. This led to the pay-
offs of the Green Revolution varieties.The second issue is the efficiency of resource allocation within
the research sector. Research resources were not distributed according
to their economic value of the different commodities produced in the
Punjab. Much of this is due to the political influence of the groups
which expected payoffs from research. Therefore, this also fits quite
well into Table 9 with the expected payoff matrix driving the system.
Cotton and wheat received an equal amount of attention and of the other
crops only sugarcane had a sustained research program. The wheat and
sugarcane research indicates that accusations of nationalists that no
work was done on food crops by colonialist governments is not true.
However, there is support for the argument that there was too much
emphasis on export crops particularly cotton. This was because only
the British cotton and wheat interest expected payoffs from research
while farmers did not. The counterfactual that an Independent government
would have done much better in allocating resources is not supported by
the facts. Pakistani Punjab did not change the allocation of resources
towards food grains until
In the second period
the late 1960’s.
farmers who wanted improved varieties of all
crops and the Bombay cotton industry replaced British cotton and wheat
interests in the expected payoff matrix. They were able to shift research
resources into the pulses, oilseeds, and millets and to keep funding of
cotton research at a high level. This meant more was spent on cotton,
oilseeds and millet than was warranted by their potential for improve-
ment and that wheat was relatively neglected. This pattern continued
until the late 1960’s when top level Pakistani officials under pressure
of two poor crop years and the cutoff of food aid shifted resources into
food grain research. The resultant payoffs of the Green Revolution led-44-
to the expectation of payoffs by farmers in all crops and the shift of
funds into oilseeds, grain and millets.
What is not evident in Table 9 is the actions of the research
institution itself. It had very little to do with setting the broad
outlines of the commodity allocation of agricultural research although
they were able to delay some inefficiencies such as investment in oil-
seeds and millets in the early period. However, they had a large role
in the decisions about the disciplines and the type of research done
within the commodity groups. In this they seem to have been guided by
efficiency considerations. Finally, regarding the decision about which
inputs should be saved there was little doubt among the British in the
research institutions and the rest of the government that land and water
were the scarce resources and research was guided by this consideration.
There was some question about the possible role of chemical fertilizer-
and tractors. Druing the British period tests were conducted which
indicated that neither of these were economical. After Independence
little research was conducted on mechanization which seems efficient,
but perhaps too little work was done on fertilizer.-45-
FIGURE 1
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Source: Chapter IV of Pray 1978
Notes: 1. Average premium of all American varieties over desi varieties
before 1947.
2. Khanewal market data only.
3. From Punjab offical data.
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